Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

5-1-2013

Willful Blindness: The Hazards of an Evolving
Standard of Knowledge
Alex Robert Daniel

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Daniel, Alex Robert, "Willful Blindness: The Hazards of an Evolving Standard of Knowledge" (2013). Law School Student Scholarship.
347.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/347

WILLFUL BLINDNESS: THE HAZARDS OF AN EVOLVING STANDARD OF
KNOWLEDGE
Alex Daniel*
I. INTRODUCTION

Many clever first year law students, suffering from the rigors and strains of their first
class on criminal law, will instinctively turn to their Black's Law Dictionary for guidance when
asked what it means to have knowledge. While such students might, on a fundamental level, be
correct when they respond that knowledge is "[a]n awareness or understanding of a fact or
circumstance," ' following the Supreme Court' s decision in Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB SA}
a more appropriate definition would include the caveat "except where the defendant was
willfully blind." In Global-Tech, the Supreme Court found cause to redefine the requirements of
knowledge mens rea for all federal courts by extending the doctrine of willful blindness from the
criminal sphere into the realm of civillaw. 3 In Global-Tech, a civil patent law case, the Supreme
Court held in an eight-to-one ruling that a defendant could be found liable for knowingly
inducing the infringement of a patent where it could be shown that the defendant was "willfully
blind" as to the existence of a preexisting patent. 4 In the course of its decision, the Supreme
Court rejected the position of the Federal Court of Appeals that "deliberate indifference" towards
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BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY THIRD POCKET EDITION 403_(3 d ed. 1996). This was the resource I first turned to
when asked to define knowledge. The result, while seeming ly satisfactory at the time, has proven to be anything
but.
2
Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB S.A., 13 1 S. Ct. 2060 (20 11).
3
4

!d.
!d. at 2072.

the existence of a patent was sufficient to impute knowledge to the defendant and instead
imported the concept of "willful blindness" from criminal law into the case. 5
According to the majority, the lower court's application of the deliberate-indifference
standard fell short of the requirements of knowledge because it required merely that there be a
"known risk" that the defendant was "deliberately indifferent towards," and did not require the
defendant to have taken some additional effort to avoid confirming that risk. 6 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court found that the defendant was still liable because it was possible for the jury to
conclude that the defendant had willfully blinded itself to the existence of a rival's patent when
the defendant marketed and sold a knock-offproduct. 7 In crafting its holding, the majority
observed that nearly every circuit court had some form of a "willful blindness" standard
incorporated into its criminal law rulings. 8 The majority further found that the lower courts
typically required a showing that the defendant was (1) subjectively aware of a high probability
of the existence of a fact and (2) took some deliberate action in avoiding confirming that fact
before knowledge could be imputed through the willful blindness standard. 9 In his lone dissent,
Justice Kennedy warned of the dangers of the majority's ruling insofar as it drastically expanded
the scope of knowledge in all federal criminal cases by means of a civil patent holding. 10
Implicit to this was Justice Kennedy's fear that by injecting the criminal law concept of "willful
blindness" into civil law the term was redefined, thus changing the scope of knowledge mens rea
not only in civil law, but also in federal criminal law. In particular, Justice Kennedy questioned
the wisdom of this expansion by means of a civil patent case without hearing a single brief from

5

Jd. at 2068-69.
/d. at 2071.
7
Jd. at2071-72.
8
Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2070.
9
/d. at 2070.
10
Jd. at 2073- 74 (Kennedy, J. , dissenting).

6
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the criminal bar. 11 Furthermore, Kennedy expressed concern that the majority bolstered its
decision with very little justification beyond a citation to a centuries-old case, which, at best,
provided ambiguous support for the majority's ruling 12 .
Although Global-Tech may appear on its face to have clarified many of the issues
underlying the standard of willful blindness, the Court's failure to adequately define its
requirement of "deliberate action" will likely prove problematic to lower courts as they apply the
case to their rulings. In a recent article, Timothy P. O'Toole noted that although nearly every
court applying willful blindness has a requirement that the defendant possess an awareness of the
high probability of the existence of a fact, there was confusion between the various lower courts
prior to Global-Tech as to whether anything more was required. 13 In particular, O'Toole noted
that "few if any courts required a separate showing of 'deliberate actions to avoid knowledge. '" 14
Although O'Toole praised the Court's decision for providing much needed clarity to the realm of
willful blindness, his optimism may be premature in light of the scant definition of "deliberate
action" provided by the Supreme Court in Global- Tech. A review of the model jury instructions
for various circuit courts makes apparent that many courts simply do not require the sort of
"deliberate action" described in Global-Tech. 15 While lower courts have had decades to develop
definitions for the element requiring "awareness of a high probability of the existence of a fact,"
their inexperience with the "deliberate action" element and the confusing precedents and facts
underlying Global-Tech will likely lead to various splits as to the definition of "deliberate
action."

fd. at 2073.
I d. at 2073.
13
Timothy P. O'Toole, Patently Unusual: How a Recent Supreme Court Patent Decision Alters the Landscape for
Proving Criminal Knowledge, 18 No. 10 WESTLA W JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY _1, 3 (20 11 ).
14 !d.
15
I d. at 4.
II
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3

As a result, the Supreme Court will likely need to use future cases to further define the
deliberate action requirement, especially as the consequences of Global- Tech expand from the
limited realm of cases regarding inducement of patent infringement into the area of federal
criminal law. There are many potential definitions for "deliberate action" which can be gleaned
from the Supreme Court' s findings in Global-Tech. On one extreme, courts could find that a
failure to investigate a suspicion of wrongdoing only results in deliberate action where the
defendant has a legally cognizable duty to investigate. At the other extreme, lower courts
interpreting Global-Tech could reasonably conclude that the bare failure to investigate a
suspicion of wrongdoing is sufficient to find deliberate action. Regardless of the interpretation,
the efficacy of and need for the willful blindness charges is quite clear. As Judge Browning
indicated in his opinion in United State v. Jewell, criminal enterprises, such as the drug trade,
which are predicated upon making many participants as ignorant of the facts as possible, would
greatly benefit from a definition of knowledge that rewards defendants for shielding themselves
from information by failing to investigate suspicions of illegality. 16 In short, criminals engaged
in valuable and illegal enterprises are legally savvy, and will exploit ambiguities in the law to
shield their illicit activities. Nevertheless, an extremely lax standard for deliberate action would
no doubt invite prosecutors to adopt willful blindness charges en masse, encouraging
overzealous prosecutions. The ideal test of deliberate action would be one that is both flexible in
its application in order to retain the viability of the willful blindness doctrine, but narrow in the
circumstances in which it applies in order to limit overzealous prosecution
In further defining the deliberate action requirement, the Supreme Court will need to
balance its desire to protect defendants from overzealous prosecution against the likelihood that
smart criminals will exploit gaps in its definition. In light of this, the Court should define
16

532 F.2d 697, 703 (9 1h Cir. 1976).
4

deliberate action to include a conscious decision by a defendant not to investigate. Furthermore,
the Court should be wary of requiring the prosecution to show that a defendant erected actual
obstacles to obtaining knowledge. Such a requirement would reward criminals who knew
enough to know how to avoid information without actually "putting on blinders." As a result,
the ideal interpretation of deliberate action would adopt a holistic approach and would apply a
totality of the circumstances test. Under such a test, courts would be invited to review the
entirety of the circumstances surrounding the case, including such factors as the burden on the
defendant of investigating suspicions of wrongdoing, the defendant's conduct in creating the
risk, the defendant's ability to avoid the risk and whether the defendant was bound by a duty that
was not followed.
This Comment will set aside the consequences of Global- Tech for future patent law
decisions and instead focus on the potential effects that its holding may have on the future of
knowledge mens rea in criminal convictions premised on willful blindness. In particular, this
Comment will describe the potential interpretations that courts may have for the "deliberate
action" element and the likely effects that these interpretations may have in criminal
prosecutions. Part II will provide a brief history of the willful blindness doctrine and its
development in the courts. Part III will break down the facts, reasoning, and prior precedent
underlying the Court's decision in Global-Tech, including the opinion of the Federal Appellate
Court, the majority opinion in Global-Tech, and Justice Kennedy's dissent. Part IV will compare
many potential interpretations of the "deliberate action" element and argue instead that in future
cases the Supreme Court should adopt a totality of the circumstances test in determining whether
a defendant's conduct rises to the level of deliberate action. Part IV will compare each J?Otential
interpretation of the deliberate action requirement against a model fact pattern and statute in

5

order to demonstrate the weaknesses and ambiguities inherent in each and conclude by
demonstrating the efficacy of a totality of the circumstances test. Part V will conclude that the
Supreme Court's failure to provide a clear definition for the "deliberate action" requirement of
the Global-Tech willful blindness standard will likely lead to confusion between circuit courts,
and will suggest that future courts implement the more flexible totality of the circumstances test.
II. THE HISTORY OF WILLFUL BLINDNESS
Willful blindness developed as a theory in English case law in a series of cases pertaining
to the application of criminal statutes where it was essential to prove to the jury that a defendant
had culpability sufficient to demonstrate knowledge. 17 In Regina v. Sleep, 18 the court ruled that a
defendant could not be found guilty of the possession of "naval stores" unless the defendant
knew "that the goods were government stores or wil?fully shut his eyes to thatfact." 19
Subsequent rulings by English courts suggested that actual knowledge was unnecessary where it
could be shown that a defendant purposefully abstained from ascertaining facts that would
support a finding ofknowledge. 20 However, confusion arose amongst English courts as to the
degree of conduct necessary to prove that a defendant was willfully blind. 21 Some courts posited
that it was simply necessary for a defendant to fail to investigate a suspicion of wrongdoing,
whereas other courts hinted that it was necessary for the prosecution to show that the
wrongdoing was so obvious that the defendant's claims of ignorance could be assumed to be
little more than a fa~ade designed to confound prosecutions?2 This discrepancy between the
English courts allowed for various conceptualizations of willful blindness to emerge. In one

17

Jonathon L. Marcus, Model Penal Code Section 2.02 (7) and Willful Blindness. 102 YALE L.J . 2231,2233 (1993).
Regina v. Sleep, 169 Eng. Rep . 1296 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1861 ).
19
Marcus, supra note 17, at 2333-34 (emphasis added) (discussing the development of willful blindness doctrine in
the English courts).
20
!d.; see Bosley v. Davies, 1 Q.B. 84 (1875); Redgate v. Haynes, l Q.B. 89 (1876).
21
Marcus, supra note 17, at 2334.
22 !d
18
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form, an actors willfully blinded themselves if they "closed their eyes to the truth." 23 Yet other
English court required that the defendant "connived" to avoid discovering knowledge of the
existence of wrongdoing. 24 To this extent, these English courts required that the prosecution
show that the defendant's ignorance was little more than an act put on by the defendant to avoid
criminal sanction. 25
Despite the ambiguities in the English courts, according to Jonathan L. Marcus, the
Supreme Court first approved the use of the willful blindness doctrine in Spurr v. United
States. 26 According to Marcus:

The defendant, Spurr, was charged with knowingly certifying certain checks
drawn on a bank account that had insufficient funds. The Court noted that an 'evil
design may be presumed if the officer purposely keeps himself in ignorance of
whether the drawer has money in the bank or not. ' The rationale behind this
presumption [was that] the defendant had a duty to know the amount of money in
a customer's account. 27
Nevertheless, in addition to cases in which defendants owed, by statute, a duty of care to others,
following Spurr, lower courts began to decide cases using willful blindness as a substitute for
knowledge in situations in which the defendant owed no legally cognizable duty to know or
become aware? 8 In particular, courts have invoked the willful blindness doctrine heavily since
its conception in cases involving narcotics convictions; such cases are, by their nature,
"prohibitory and involve no legal duty to know. " 29 According to Robin Chari ow, an express or
implied duty to know places the burden on the defendant to search out additional information
when there is a suspicion of wrong doing or a danger of abuse, such that it can be said that the

23
24

Robin Charlow, Willful ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 T EX. L. R EV. 1351, 1362--63 (1992).
Charlow, supra note 23 , at 1363--64.

25

/d.

26

19 S.Ct. 812 (1899).
Marcus, supra note 17, at 2334 (emphasis added).
28 /d.
29 Jd.
27
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willing failure to discover positive knowledge carries with it the stigma of an "evil intent." 30
However, where no such duty exists it is more controversial to say that a defendant is required to
search out additional information any time the defendant suspects criminal acts because the
scope of potential liability increases dramatically without the requisite increase in the moral
opprobrium surrounding the failure to investigate. 3 1
The drafters of the Model Penal Code ("MPC") sought to address the controversial
question of willful blindness in their formation of the various levels of culpability. 32 In
particular, the drafters wanted to address situations where the defendant is "aware of the
probable existence of a material fact but does not determine whether it exists or does not exist."33
According to the text of the MPC, an actor "knowingly" acts in regards to an element of a crime
[i]f the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances,
he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically
certain that his conduct will cause such a result. 34
However, in addition to this, the drafters stated that "[w]hen knowledge of the existence of a
particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a
high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist. "35 According
to Marcus, this rule was justified on the basis that:
the actor who commits an act even though he knows it is highly probable that a
crucial fact exists is just as culpable as the actor who has virtually certain
knowledge. The actor who is aware of a high probability of a fact's existence has

°

3

Charlow, supra 23 , at 1407-78 (discussing the policy rationales and invocations of morality which underlie
convictions based on the "willful blindness" doctrine).
31
ld. at 1409.
32
Douglas N . Husak & Craig A. Callender, Wilful ignorance, Kn owledge, and the "Equal Culpability" Thesis: A
Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle ofLegality, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 29, 36 ( 1994 ).
33 ld
34
35

MODEL PENAL C ODE § 2 .02 (b) .
M ODEL PENAL C ODE § 2.07 .
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been 'put on notice;' that is, he has the opportunity, if he cares, to investi~ate and
3
eliminate any doubt before acting or, in any event, to refrain from acting.
For Marcus, an actor's indifference towards the existence of criminality is itself the best
justification for a willful blindness charge. 37 When such an actor chooses to act despite his
awareness that his actions are likely criminal, the actor has manifested a complete disregard for
the values of society. 38 For Marcus, such disregard is as offensive to the law as acting with the
knowledge that one is engaged in criminality. 39 To this extent, the drafters of the MPC regarded
individuals who possessed a high awareness of material elements of a crime, but chose not to
pursue those facts any further and acted despite their awareness, to be just as morally culpable as
those who acted with full awareness of their conduct, the surrounding circumstances, and the
likely results thereof. 40
Although other cases in United States courts were responsible for opening the door for
willful blindness convictions, in particular Leary v. United States 41 and Turner v. United States,42
willful blindness, as applied in a modem sense, first appeared in the criminal case of United

36

Marcus, supra note 17, at 2235-36 . See also David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 G EO. L.J. 957, 961-65
(1999) ("The drafters of the Model Penal Code simply abandoned the doctrine that willful blindness can substitute
for knowledge. In its place, they proposed that awareness of the high probability of a fact is tantamount to
knowledge of that fact. In this way, they preserved the root intuition that criminal guilt requires some guilty mental
state. Here, the guilty mental state is awareness of the high probability of a fact, presumably whatever fact the
willfully blind person is arranging not to know.").
37
Marcus, supra note 17, at 2235- 36.
38 /d.
39
/d. at 2236.
40
Luban, supra note 36, at 961-65.
41
Leary v. U.S ., 395 U.S. 6, 46 n.93 (1968). In Lemy, the Supreme Court first adopted the MPC's definition of
knowledge, which provides that "[w ]hen knowledge of the existence -of a particular fact is an element of an offense,
such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes
that it does not exist." As a result of this holding, the Court relaxed the requirement of actual knowledge and opened
the door to lesser showings of knowledge.
42
Turner v. United States, 396 U.S . 398, 415- 17 (1969) (upholding the defendant ' s conviction for trafficking heroin
on the grounds that the defendant was likely aware that 1ittle if any heroin is actually manufactured in the United
States and, as a result, must be smuggled from foreign countries in order to meet the demand for the drug in
American markets. On this basis, the Court concluded that the defendant was likely aware of the high likelihood
that the heroin he possessed was foreign manufactured and that a conviction for trafficking based on such a finding
would be consistent with the MPC ' s definition of knowledge) .
9

States v. Jewell. 43 In Jewell, the Court ruled that where a person is aware of facts demonstrating

a high risk of criminal wrongdoing and deliberately chooses not to further investigate the
surrounding circumstances, knowledge of the critical facts can be imputed to that person.

44

In

Jewell, the defendant crossed the border into Mexico and a stranger offered the defendant a

chance to purchase narcotics. 45 The defendant turned down the offer, but subsequently agreed to
drive a car for the stranger across the border for $100. 46 The police stopped the car, searched it
and found it contained over 100 pounds of marijuana in a secret compartment that was visible to
the driver as a large void in the side of the vehicle. 47 The defendant was subsequently charged
and convicted of knowingly possessing illegal narcotics. 48 The defendant testified that he did not
know that the drugs were in the car, but that he did believe at the start of the trip that there was
likely something illegal and questionable about the whole affair. 49 Despite that suspicion, he
admittedly did not engage in any further investigation beyond a short inspection of the trunk and
glove compartment of the car. 50
The Court found that such circumstances were sufficient to justify a conviction on the
basis of willful blindness as the defendant was aware of a high probability that the vehicle
contained illegal drugs and consciously chose not to investigate the contents of the secret
compartment in the car in order to avoid learning the truth. 51 According to two commentators,
the purpose of the Jewell holding was to convict a defendant who clearly lacked the mental state

43

O'Toole, supra note 13 , at 1; United States v. Jewel, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976).
United States v. Jewel, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976).
45
ld. at 699 n.l.
46
!d. at 699 n.2.
47 !d.
48
!d. at 698.
49
ld. at 699 n.2.
50
Jewel, 532 F.2d at 699 n.2.
51
!d. at 698.
44

10

of actual knowledge of the facts essential to conviction. 52 As a result, two rationales could
potentially underlie and support willful blindness as applied to a fact pattern similar to Jewell.
Under one rationale, the mental state described by "willful blindness," which the authors refer to
as "willful ignorance," is nothing more than a kind of knowledge separate from, but still
equivalent to, actual knowledge. 53 Under the other potential rationale, willful blindness would
not be construed as another form of knowledge, but rather as the moral equivalent to knowledge
insofar as it raises similar moral objections. 54 Regardless of the rationale supporting the court's
use of willful blindness in criminal convictions requiring knowledge culpability, it is obvious
that, since Jewell, the application of willful blindness in criminal courts generally-and in drug
convictions specifically-has increased significantly. 55 Prior to Global-Tech almost all of the
circuits had some variant of the willful blindness doctrine embedded in their mens rea
jurisprudence. 56 Nearly all the circuits shared the requirement that the defendant be shown to
have had an awareness of the high probability of the existence of a fact to justify a finding of
willful blindness. 57 However, with the Supreme Court's addition of the "deliberate action"
requirement in Global- Tech, lower courts are faced with the task of deciding just what level of
activity qualifies as "deliberate action." Unfortunately, the Supreme Court gave little guidance
for courts to follow. According to O'Toole "Global-Tech makes clear that securing an attorney
opinion about existing patents while intentionally withholding critical facts and copying a
product whose markings will not provide proof of knowledge of that patent qualify as "active
52

Husak, supra note 32, at 35-36.
ld. at 36.
54
!d. at 36- 37.
55
O'Toole, supra note 13, at 1-2. "After Jewell, the use of the doctrine expanded rapidly, becoming commonplace
in drug prosecutions. By 1982, the 9th Circuit had described willful blindness as an integral part of the drug trade.
And this made some sense: In inherently illegal industries such as the drug, gambling or counterfeit trades, strong
incentives exist for individuals to avoid gaining knowledge to protect them in an easily foreseeable criminal
prosecution."
56
ld. at 3.
53

57

!d.
11

efforts" to avoid knowledge of patent infringement. But the opinion contains little additional
guidance about how this requirement will play out in other contexts." 58 Because of this, lower
courts will struggle to give definition to "deliberate action," with numerous circuit splits likely as
a result.
III. ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL-TECH
A. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Decision in Global-Tech v. SEB S A.
Global-Tech arose out a claim for inducement of patent infringement against the

company Global-Tech Appliances ("Global-Tech") by the manufacturer SEB S.A. ("SEB").59 In
the 1980s, SEB developed a revolutionary deep fryer for home use that was cool to the touch and
used an innovative and inexpensive design to overcome the costs associated with using heat
resistant plastics; for this, it received a U.S. Patent in 1991. 60 In 1997, Sunbeam Products, Inc.
("Sunbeam") approached defendant Pentalpha Enterprises ("Pentalpha"), a subsidiary of GlobalTech, with a request that Pentalpha supply Sunbeam with a deep fryer that met certain
specifications. 61 For the sake of simplicity, Global-Tech and Pentalpha will be referred to
collectively as "Pentalpha" for the remainder of this section, unless otherwise specified.
Pentalpha thereafter acquired a version of the SEB deep fryer that was marketed in Hong Kong. 62
Because it was a foreign-marketed product, this deep fryer did not display any U.S . patent
markings that would otherwise show it to be protected by SEB ' s patent. 63 Pentalpha reverse
engineered and copied the internal workings of the foreign-marketed deep fryer, including the
cool-touch technology, crafted its own exterior and aesthetic design, and began marketing it to

58

O 'Toole, supra note 13 , at 5.
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
60
SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co ., 594 F.3d 1360, 1365-66 (20 10).
61
Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2064.
62 !d.
63 ld

59
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third parties, including Sunbeam. 64 Prior to agreeing to sell its copied deep fryer to third parties,
Pentalpha acquired a "right-to-use study" from an attorney. 65 In all, the attorney examined
twenty-six individual patents and concluded that "none of the claims in those patents read on
[defendant's] deep fryer." 66 Global-Tech, however, had neglected to inform the attorney
performing the right-to-use study that it had previously copied its design from a foreignmarketed version of the SEB deep fryer. 67 Because Sunbeam was able to buy its product from
Pentalpha at a cheaper price, it was able to undercut SEB in sales in the United States. 68
Sunbeam began selling the deep fryer that it acquired from Pentalpha in the United States
under its own trademarks, and subsequently SEB sued for patent infringement in March of 1998
in the District Court for the District of New Jersey. 69 Sunbeam informed Pentalpha in April of
1998 that it was the subject of a law suit for patent infringement. 70 This suit ultimately ended in
a settlement with Sunbeam in which Sunbeam agreed to pay SEB the sum of $2 million. 71
Despite being warned of the patent infringement law suit, Pentalpha continued to sell the deep
fryer to other distributors, including Fingerhut Corp. and Montgomery Ward. 72 In 1999, SEB
filed for and received a preliminary injunction barring Global-Tech from continuing these sales.
By 2001 , discovery had closed, and by 2006, the district court began its trial against Pentalpha
for inducement of patent infringement. 73 Following the close of evidence, Pentalpha moved for a
judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence showing that
64

ld.

65

SEB S.A., 594 F.3d at 1366.
Jd.

66

67

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2064 (2011)
68ld.
69

SEB S.A, 594 F.3d at 1366.
Jd.
7 1 Jd.
72 !d.
73
/d. at 1367. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010) ( "(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States
any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent. (b) Whoever actively induces
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer. ").
70

13

Pentalpha had any knowledge of the existence of SEB ' s patent at the time of the alleged
inducement of patent infringement. 74 Although the trial court noted that there was no evidence

that the defendant actually knew of the existence of SEB ' s patent, it found that there was
evidence to support SEB ' s theory ofinducement. 75 At trial, SEB argued that a jury could
conclude that Pentalpha had knowledge of the existence of the patent from the fact that
Pentalpha failed to disclose to the attorney performing the right-to-use study the fact that it had
reverse engineered a foreign-marketed version of the SEB deep fryer. 76 SEB argued that
Pentalpha engaged in this conduct knowing that the right-to-use study was doomed to fail and
was calculated so as not to discover the existence of the SEB patent. 77 While the trial court
found that the defendant did not have actual knowledge of the existence of the SEB patent, the
jury could conclude that the defendant was aware he was "likely violating a patent .... " 78 As a
result, the case went to the jury, which concluded that Global-Tech, through its subsidiary
Pentalpha, had infringed and induced others to infringe on SEB ' s patent. 79 The defendants
responded to this decision by appealing and challenging the trial court' s findings as to SEB ' s
theory of infringement. 80
The Appellate Court of the Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court' s opinion in regards to
the inducement of patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(b). 81 The panel concluded that 35
U.S. C. § 271 (b) requires a showing of specific intent by the defendant to induce others to

74

SEB S.A, 594 F.3d at 1367.
Jd.
76 ld.
77 Jd.
78 ld.
79
!d. at 1367- 68.
80
SEB S.A., 594 F.3d at 1368.
81
/d. at 1365.
75

14

infringe on the plaintiff's patent in accordance with the court's prior precedent. 82 Citing the
concept of "deliberate indifference," the panel held that where a defendant has ( 1) actual
knowledge of a known risk and (2) disregards that risk, knowledge is imputed to the defendant in
civil patent litigation. 83 The Federal Circuit found that in many cases, other courts deciding a
similar issue had concluded that deliberate indifference is not a substitute for actual knowledge,
but rather that it is just another form of actual knowledge. 84 To that extent, in order to defeat a
showing that the defendant was deliberately indifferent towards a known risk, the defendant
would need to merely prove that he did not have actual knowledge of that risk. 85
Applying the deliberate indifference standard to the facts of Global-Tech, the Federal
Circuit concluded that there was sufficient evidence to show that Pentalpha was aware of a
known risk of the existence of SEB' s patent and that it chose to wrongly disregard that risk when
it manufactured, marketed, and sold its knock -off deep fryer to distributors. 86 According to the
court, the jury heard evidence that the defendant purchased a version of SEB' s deep fryerwhich was marketed in Hong Kong-and copied it in all aspects, save for its aesthetics and
cosmetic design. 87 Additionally, there was evidence showing that although the defendant
obtained a right-to-use study, it chose not to inform the attorney performing the study that the
defendant had copied the design from a version of the SEB deep-fryer which was free from U.S.
patent markings. 88 For the Federal Circuit, evidence that the defendant, a company savvy in

82

!d. at 1376 ("This court has made clear, however, that inducement requires a showing of 'specific intent to
encourage another's infringement."'). See also Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc. , 543 F.3d 683 , 699 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (quoting DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (2011)) ("As other courts have observed,
'specific intent' in the civil context is not so narrow as to allow an accused wrongdoer to actively disregard a known
risk that an element of the offense exists.").
83
SEB S.A, 594 F.3d at 1376-78.
84 ld.
85
!d. at 1378.
86 !d.
87
/d. at 1377.
88 !d.
15

patent law and manufacturing, failed to inform counsel of such copying clearly supported a
finding that the defendant was deliberately indifferent towards the existence of SEB ' s protective
patent. 89 According to the court, Pentalpha could have defeated a finding that it had been
deliberately indifferent towards the existence of SEB ' s patent by providing evidence that it
actually believed that SEB's patent did not exist. 90 Nevertheless, Pentalpha failed to argue at
trial that, as a result of the lack of patent marking on the copied deep fryer, it actually believed
that no rival patent existed. 91
B. Majority Holding and Reasoning in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB SA.
Although the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the result of the trial and the Federal
Circuit' s decision to impute knowledge to Pentalpha, it rejected the Federal Circuit's use of the
deliberate indifference standard. 92 Although the Supreme Court agreed with the Federal
Circuit's ruling that 35 U.S.C. 271(b) requires knowledge of the existence of a preexisting patent
before civil sanction can attach, it rejected the sufficiency of the deliberate indifference standard
to demonstrate knowledge scienter. 93 Instead, the Court ruled that Pentalpha knowingly induced
patent infringement through its sales of the copied deep-fryer under the doctrine of willful
blindness. 94 The majority found willful blindness to be the appropriate standard on the grounds
that it prevents defendants from escaping liability for charges requiring knowledge where the
defendant has deliberately shielded himself from "clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly
suggested by the circumstances." 95 The majority opined that the rationale traditionally cited in
justification of the willful blindness doctrine was that defendants who knew enough to shield
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themselves from knowing more were just as culpable as those defendants who had actual
knowledge. 96
In formulating its definition of willful blindness, the majority concluded that "a willfully
blind defendant is one who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of
wrongdoing and who can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts. " 97 According
to the Court, the deliberate indifference standard adopted by the Court of Appeals did not rise to
the level necessary to impute knowledge to the defendant because it did not distinguish itself
from recklessness and negligence clearly. 98 To this extent, the Court found that the two chief
elements of a willful blindness charge are ( 1) that the defendant was aware of a high probability
of the existence of a fact, and (2) that the defendant took deliberate actions in order to avoid
confirming the existence of that fact. 99 The majority stated that this formulation of willful
blindness was superior to others on the grounds that it clearly distinguished itself from both
negligence and recklessness to the effect that where the defendant' s action did not rise above
reckless, no willful blindness culpability could attach. 100 In particular, the majority compared
willful blindness to recklessness and negligence on the grounds that a willfully blind defendant
can "almost be said to know" of wrongdoing, whereas "[b ]y contrast, a reckless defendant is one
who merely knows of a substantial and unjustified risk of such wrongdoing ... and a negligent
defendant is one who should have known of a similar risk but, in fact, did not .... " 101 In this
regard, the majority rejected deliberate indifference on the ground that deliberate indifference
merely requires a showing that the defendant was aware of a known risk and was "deliberately
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indifferent" towards it; the majority did not agree that it also requires the defendant to have
engaged in some active effort to avoid ascertaining knowledge of the risk.

102

The majority supported its holdings by citing the prior decisions describing willful
blindness and the findings of the drafters of the MPC with regards to their conceptualization of
knowledge mens rea. 103 In particular, the majority cited Spurr v. United State/ 04 and United
States v. Jewell 105 to support its definition of and decision to import willful blindness into patent

law. 106 The Court cited Spurr on the grounds that the centuries-old case endorsed a concept very
similar to willful blindness. 107 In Spurr, the Court held that a bank officer could be found to
have violated a statute that made it a crime to willfully certify a check drawn against sufficient
funds "if the [bank] officer purposely [kept] himself in ignorance of whether the drawer [had]
money in the bank." 108 Furthermore, the majority cited Jewell in support of the notion that
defendants who blind themselves to "direct proof of critical facts in effect have actual knowledge
of those facts." 109 Finally, the majority noted that the MPC, which had often been used by the
Court as a guide in analyzing statutory culpability requirements, made room for the willful
blindness doctrine insofar as it defined '"knowledge of the existence of a particular fact' to
include a situation in which 'a person is aware of the high probability of [the fact's] existence,
unless he actually believes it does not exist. "' 110
Applying its standard for willful blindness to the facts of Global-Tech, the majority
concluded that the defendant had willfully blinded itself as to the existence of SEB' s protective
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patent. 111 According to the majority, Pentalpha was aware of the revolutionary nature and
superior design of SEB' s patent when it decided to reverse engineer the design. 112 The testimony
of the CEO and President ofPentalpha, John Sham, who stated that in developing the deep fryer
for Sunbeam, Pentalpha had performed thorough market research, demonstrated this
awareness. 113 Furthermore, the fact that Pentalpha copied all but the cosmetic features of the
SEB product showed Pentalpha' s awareness that the SEB design "embodied advanced
technology that would be valuable in the U.S. market .... " 114 The Court found particularly
salient the fact that Pentalpha had chosen to copy a foreign-marketed version of the plaintiffs
patented deep fryer and failed to inform the attorney it hired to perform the right-to-use study of
this fact. 115 Sham himself was an inventor on many U.S. patents and would have known that
foreign-marketed products would not contain any reference to potential U.S. patents. 116 As a
result, the majority opined that defendant's failure to provide an explanation for his decision not
to tell the attorney was all-the-more telling of his true purpose in initiating the right-to-use
study-to manufacture a claim of plausible deniability should Pentalpha be accused of inducing
patent infringement. 117 When asked whether or not informing the attorney that the design had
been copied would have increased the likelihood that he would have found a U.S. patent during
his right-to-use study, Sham stated that a patent search was not an "easy job," which is why he
had lawyers perform them for him. 118 The majority concluded in light of these facts that the
defendant could be found liable with regards to inducement of patent infringement to the extent
that it had willfully blinded itself from knowledge as to the existence of SEB's preexisting U.S.
111
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patent. In effect, the defendant willfully blinded itself to the existence of a prior U.S. patent by
commissioning a right-to-use study without informing the investigating attorney that it had
copied its design for its product from a foreign-marketed version of a competitor's patented
product.
C. Kennedy's Dissent
As the lone dissenting justice, Justice Kennedy challenged the majority's decision to
import the concept of willful blindness from criminal law into the field of civil patent law,
arguing that its reasoning supporting its adoption of the standard in this context was flawed at
best. 119 According to Kennedy, the majority adopted willful blindness in an effort to draw in
defendants who otherwise could not be found to have knowledge under the inducement of patent
infringement statute: "[ o]ne can believe that there is a 'high probability' that acts might infringe
a patent but nonetheless conclude they do not infringe ... the alleged inducer who believes a

°

device is noninfringing catmot be said to know otherwise." 12 For Kennedy, the majority's
decision to import willful blindness into patent law drained the doctrine of any and all legitimacy
with regards to justifications that depend on finding that willful blindness is either the same thing
as knowledge or that it can be properly punished because it triggers the same degree of moral
opprobrium as knowingly acting in defiance of the law. 121 In particular, Justice Kennedy
assailed the majority's finding that a defendant who avoided confirmation of a fact is just as
morally culpable as one who has actual knowledge of the fact. 122 Although Kennedy seems to
acknowledge the appeal of this argument in the realm of criminal prosecutions, Kennedy argued
that the retributive purpose of criminal prosecutions to punish moral wrongs through a system of
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laws does not attach in the area of patent law, which is utilitarian in nature. 123 Because of the
utilitarian nature of patent law, retributivist justifications for the willful blindness doctrine lose
much of their strength when taken out of the context of criminal cases. 124
Furthermore, Kennedy challenged the majority' s interpretation of Spurr, 125 which it cited
in support of its holding. 126 According to Kennedy, the real question underlying Spurr was
whether or not the "defendant's admitted violation was willful." 127 To this extent, Kennedy
concluded that Spurr_stood merely for the proposition that wrongful intent could be inferred from
the attendant circumstances surrounding a case and that it did stand not for the majority' s
position that willful blindness was equivalent to knowledge. 128 The risk of confused precedent is
even more apparent when Jewell and Spurr-two cases cited favorably by the majority despite
having strongly opposed reasoning-are read alongside one another. According to Justice
Kennedy, the decision to import willful blindness into patent law, and thus redefine all scienter
requirements for knowledge in all federal courts in all criminal cases requiring knowledge, was
made without so much as a single brief from the criminal bar. 129 Under such circumstances,
Kennedy concluded that it was hugely inappropriate to incorporate a criminal-law concept into
civil patent law. Kennedy argued that a jury could have reasonably inferred that the defendant
did have knowledge of SEB ' s patent based on circumstantial evidence surrounding the

°

defendant' s conduct in avoiding potential confirmation of the patent' s existence. 13 For Kennedy
the majority seemed to justify importing willful blindness on the unstated grounds that
knowledge otherwise requires certainty, despite the fact that law often allows "probabilistic
123

!d. at 2073 .
Jd.
125
174 U.S. 728 (1899) .
126
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. , 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2069 (2011).
127
!d. at 2073.
128 !d.
129 !d.
130 Jd.
124

21

judgments to count as knowledge." 131 To this end, Kennedy rejected the Court' s decision to
invoke the willful blindness doctrine and thereby redefine all scienter requirements in all
criminal cases in federal court.
IV. HOW MUCH ACTION IS DELIBERATE ACTION?
According to the Supreme Court' s holding in Global-Tech to prove a defendant was
willfully blind, the prosecution must show that the defendant had an awareness of a high
probability of the existence of a material fact and that the defendant took deliberate action in
order to avoid confirming the existence of that fact such that the defendant can almost be said to
have actually known the fact. 132 The Supreme regarded these requirements to be nearly
universally shared among all the circuit courts, yet O'Toole argued in his recent article in the
Westlaw Journal of Intellectual Property that, in actuality, the circuits are not nearly so uniform
in their definitions. 133 Although prior to Global-Tech, nearly all the circuit courts universally
required a showing that the defendant was subjectively aware that there was a high probability
that a fact existed, many courts did not require a showing of deliberate action to avoid
knowledge, and many others fail to exclude recklessness from a finding of willful blindness. 134
A model jury instruction from the Eighth Circuit is indicative of this problem. According to the
jury instruction:
You may find that the defendant [(name)] acted knowingly if you find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant [(name)] was aware of a high probability that
(state fact as to which knowledge is in question (e.g. , that ' drugs were contained
in his suitcase' )) and that [he] [she] deliberately avoided learning the truth. The
element of knowledge may be inferred if the defendant [(name)] deliberately
closed [his] [her] eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to [him] [her].
[You may not find the defendant acted ' knowingly' if you find he/she was merely
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negligent, careless or mistaken as to (state fact as to which knowledge IS In
question (e.g., that "drugs were contained in his suitcase")).]135
The Eighth Circuit' s model jury instruction fails to require a showing that the defendant
deliberately acted to avoid ascertaining the facts to which they claim to have no knowledge,
using merely the passive language that the defendant need only to have "deliberately avoided
learning the truth. " 136 Additionally, while the instruction does give an example of what might
constitute an act that willfully blinded the defendant (i.e. closing one' s eyes to what would
otherwise be obvious), it does not exclude from its reach reckless behavior, which might come in
under a close reading of the instruction.
Circuit courts will have an opportunity to review their requirements for willful blindness
and will need to construct definitions for the deliberate-action standard to comport with the
Supreme Court's ruling in Global-Tech. Recently, in United States v. Vasquez, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of a defendant who had been charged with possession
with intent to distribute cocaine, importing cocaine into the United States, and conspiring to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine on the grounds that the defendant had been deliberately
ignorant.

137

In making its decision, the Fifth Circuit cited to Global- Tech in passing without

giving much attention to the question of Global-Tech' s deliberate-action requirement, but stated
that at a minimum the defendant must make a conscious decision to avoid confirmation of a fact
or avoid information. 138 In United States v. Butler, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court' s
decision to grant a willful blindness charge to the prosecution on the grounds that a "defendant's
willful blindness may serve as the basis for knowledge if, in light of certain obvious facts ,
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reasonable inferences support a finding that a defendant's failure to investigate is equivalent to
burying one' s head in the sand." 139 In Butler, the defendant was convicted of bank fraud and had
his sentence mandatorily increased because of the aggravating circumstance of having managed
or coordinated actors who knowingly participated in the scheme. 140 The court found that while
the other actors in the scheme may not have had direct knowledge that they were participating in
bank fraud, their failure to investigate further was sufficient to impute knowledge where they
actors were aware of facts that put them on notice of criminal activity. 141
As evidenced by the reasoning of the circuit courts, the deliberate-action requirement is
more as ambiguous than a cursory reading of Global- Tech may suggest. While both circuits
ultimately upheld the convictions, the Fifth Circuit found that at a minimum the defendant must
take deliberate steps to prevent him or herself from confirming wrongdoing, 142 whereas the
Eighth Circuit was willing to uphold a conviction where there was a simple failure to investigate
further with the intent to remain ignorant. 143 The simple fact of the matter is that that the vast
majority of pre-Global-Tech willful blindness cases have gone forward without being reviewed
for deliberate action on the part of the defendant. 144 Additionally, upon close inspection
majority' s holding in Global-Tech that the court gave scant definition to the deliberate action
require apart from citations to prior cases that seem to have conflicting results as pertains to
willful blindness. As a result, courts developing future willful blindness charges, in light of
these doctrinal contradictions, will likely arrive at varying definitions of what actually constitutes
deliberate action. This section will explore the plausible interpretations of the deliberate action
requirement in light of majority' s opinion in Global- Tech.
139
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A. Deliberate Action: A Duty to Investigate v. Failure to Investigate
The Supreme Court cited two significant cases in support of its proposition that willful
blindness had long been accepted and endorsed in federal criminallaw. 145 In particular, the
majority cited Spurr v. United States and United States v. Jewel to support its conclusion that it
was a long-recognized principle that where a defendant is aware of the highly probable existence
of a material element and deliberately avoids discovering that element, knowledge can be
permissibly imputed to the defendant. 146 However, these cases justify this outcome on two
distinct and opposing bases.
In Spurr, a bank officer was charged with violating a federal statute that made it a crime
to willfully certify a check despite the account of the drawer not having funds sufficient to clear
the check. 147 Before the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that he could not have knowingly
certified a check from an overdrawn account because he was not aware of the amount of money
within the account as he had not inspected the account before certification. 148 The Court ruled,
in language that the majority in Global-Tech quoted, that "[i]f an officer certifies a check with
the intent that the drawer shall obtain so much money out of the bank, when he has none there,
such officer not only certifies unlawfully, but the specific intent to violate the statute may be
imputed ... evil design may be presumed if the officer purposely keeps himself in ignorance of
whether the drawer has money in the bank or not, or is grossly indifferent to his duty in respect to
.
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an affirmative duty to investigate chose not to act upon that duty despite the obvious risks
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posed. 15 Furthermore, the court indicated that where the defendant has no duty to investigate,
willful intent (knowledge) could only be premised upon a showing that the defendant
purposefully kept himself "in ignorance" with respect to a critical fact. 151 However, when
applying this standard to the facts of the case, the Court found that while the defendant did owe a
duty to investigate the amount of money in the drawer' s account and failed to fulfill that duty,
evidence showing that the defendant reasonably relied in good faith on the assertions of a
subordinate as to the amount of money in the drawer' s account could be sufficient to exculpate
the defendant. 152
As a result, courts following the Spurr line of reasoning will find deliberate action on the
part of the defendant in two limited circumstances. Read alone, the result of the Spurr holding is
that for a defendant to be willfully blind as to a fact in absence of evidence showing of actual
knowledge, it is sufficient to show that the defendant had a duty of affirmative investigation
which the defendant consciously ignored. 153 As a result, one potential interpretation of
deliberate action is that where a defendant is found to have an affirmative duty to investigate, the
conscious decision not to investigate is sufficient to show deliberate action. Alternatively, if a
defendant did not owe such a duty, the Spurr Court implied that it would be necessary for the
prosecution to show that the defendant purposefully made himself ignorant of the material
element of the crime by shielding himself from facts. 154 As a result, in cases where the
defendant owes no duty to investigate, the defendant's failure to investigate alone is insufficient
to prove willful blindness. This standard recognizes " [t]he decision to avoid knowledge typically
involves an omission ; the purpose is formed in the actor's mind and will rarely be manifested by
150
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any kind of unequivocal act or deliberate undertaking." 155 As a result, the duty requirement
ensures that the defendant's failure to investigate is not simply a negligent omission, but rather is
the result of a conscious choice. 156 This conforms to the position of the Model Penal Code that
states that unless a law specifically defining an offense holds omissions sufficient, omissions will
not create criminal liability unless "a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by
law." 157 According to Robin Charlow, "in a case such as Spurr, when one has a specific
statutory duty to investigate and to obtain knowledge of a fact in order lawfully to perform some
act, one cannot deliberately fail to investigate, remain ignorant, and thereby escape liability for
the act." 158 As a result of this reading of Spurr, a court attempting to interpret the Supreme
Court' s deliberate-action requirement in Global-Tech may conclude that (1) if the defendant can
be found to owe a duty to investigate, his/her failure to investigate constitutes deliberate action;
and (2) that in the absence of such a duty, the failure to investigate does not constitute deliberate
action, and the defendant must be shown to have purposefully avoided or erected barriers to
prevent him from ascertaining a fact which otherwise would have been obvious to the defendant
before deliberate action can be found.
However, there is some tension between this interpretation and the Court' s holding in
Global-Tech, specifically the absence of a finding that Pentalpha was under a duty to investigate.
The majority found that Pentalpha's CEO and president, John Sham, was a highly
knowledgeable inventor who himself was the named inventor on several U.S. patents.
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fryer. 16 Furthermore, as an inventor, Sham was well aware that foreign-marketed products
usually do not have U.S. patent markings, yet he chose not to inform the attorney assigned to do
the right-to-use study that the Pentalpha deep-fryer was copied from a knockoff. 161 Yet absent
from the Court' s opinion is any statement to the effect that either Pentalpha or Sham were under
a duty to investigate at the time they engaged in the right-to-use study. However, like the bank
clerk in Spurr who on account of his duty understood the risks of failing investigate the amount
of money in a drawer' s account, Sham was effectively on notice that a preexisting U.S. patent
might have existed, yet he chose not to reveal these facts to his investigating attorney. While it
cannot be necessarily said that he had a duty to investigate, Sham' s status as a sophisticated
inventor strengthens the conclusion that his failure to inform the investigating attorney was not a
negligent omission, but rather a conscious choice.
Yet, this interpretation is not without drawbacks. According to O'Toole, "In inherently
illegal industries such as the drug, gambling or counterfeit trades, strong incentives exist for
individuals to avoid gaining knowledge to protect them in an easily foreseeable criminal
prosecution." 162 Ultimately, the result of an interpretation predicated upon the defendant having
a preexisting duty to investigate would be to tnake it very difficult to use the willful blindness
doctrine to convict defendants participating in the transport of illegal narcotics who can
legitimately say that they merely failed to investigate for drugs. It can hardly be said that "drug
mules" are obligated by any duty to investigate the narcotics they are required to smuggle across
the border. Furthermore, as demonstrated clearly in Jewell, drug mules often cite as a defense
the fact that they did not actually know they were carrying drugs with them and that they merely

160

!d.

Jd.
162
O ' Toole, supra note 13 , at 1.

16 1

28

failed to investigate suspicions of illegality. 163 If courts predicate successful convictions using
the willful blindness doctrine on a showing that the defendant owed a duty to investigate,
defendants who, like the one in Jewell, claim that they just did not look hard enough will likely
be rewarded with acquittal.
B. Deliberate Action-The Failure to Investigate
In bolstering its position in Global Tech, the majority also cited the case of United States
v. Jewell for the proposition that willful blindness constituted just another form of knowledge.

164

In Jewell, the defendant was convicted of knowingly possessing a controlled substance for trying
to drive an automobile containing over 100 pounds marijuana across the border between the
United States and Mexico. 165 The defendant argued that he did not know the vehicle contained a
controlled substance. 166 Prior to driving the vehicle, the defendant had been approached by a
man named "Ray" who had tried to sell the defendant marijuana. 167 Although the defendant
turned down the offer to purchase drugs from Ray, he immediately agreed to drive a car across
the border in exchange for $1 00. 168 Enforcement officers stopped the defendant's car, searched
it and discovered a secret compartment containing over 100 pounds of marijuana. 169 The drug
enforcement officer testified that the defendant told the drug enforcement officer that he was
suspicious of the vehicle and performed a brief inspection of the glove box and trunk before
driving. 170 At trial the defendant testified that while he had seen the opening of the secret
compartment, he did not know what it was and did not bother to examine it or its contents to the
effect that he did not know that the vehicle he was driving contained any controlled
163
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substances. 171 The Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, held that the defendant could willfully blinded
himself to the existence of the marijuana insofar as the defendant was virtually aware of the
secret compartment, yet deliberately "refrained from acquiring positive knowledge" of existence
of the marijuana in it. 172 According to the Ninth Circuit, a defendant is willfully blind if the
defendant's ignorance was "entirely a result of [the defendant] having made a conscious purpose
to disregard the nature of that which was in the vehicle, with a conscious purpose to avoid
learning the truth." 173
The court justified its holding that willful blindness was an adequate substitute for actual
knowledge to the extent that willful blindness was as equally culpable as actual knowledge. 174
The court stated that willful blindness was effectively just another form of knowledge to the
extent that the defendant is sufficiently aware of the probable existence of a fact to know how to
avoid confirming it. 175 The concept behind this justification is that if a defendant knows enough
to understand that knowing more would make him criminally liable, he can almost be said to
have actual knowledge of a material element of a crime. To the extent that actual knowledge
does not require positive knowledge of the existence of a fact, willful blindness allows courts to
convict defendants who have avoided gathering any more information than absolutely necessary
. order to remain
. Ignorant.
.
176
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As a result a court could conclude based on the language of the Jewell holding that
deliberate action can be found any time a defendant fails to investigate a suspicion of
wrongdoing or criminality. Under this interpretation, where a defendant is aware of a high
probability of wrongdoing and consciously chooses not to investigate that suspicion of
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wrongdoing in order to avoid confirming wrongdoing, they are willfully blind. At a minimum,
to demonstrate deliberate action sufficient to prove willful blindness, a prosecutor need only
prove that the defendant consciously chose not to gain positive knowledge of the existence of a
fact. Rather than having to prove that the defendant proactively erected barriers to prevent
himself from learning criminally culpable information, the prosecution need only show that the
defendant had an opportunity to investigate and that he chose not to act. 177
While the appeal of such a standard to prosecutors seeking easy convictions is clear, the
specter of overzealous prosecutions and unfair convictions is equally apparent. The dangers
imposed by such a standard are best explained by means of an example. Consider the following
facts. A woman meets her mother and borrows a relative's car in order to drive her mother
across the border. The woman notices that her mother is acting suspiciously as they approach
the border and notes a strong perfume smell in the vehicle. The woman asks her mother to
explain the smell, but the mother claims that she spilled fabric softener in the car the day before.
The woman is incredulous and suspects something is wrong, but continues to drive towards the
border. Border patrol agents stop the car and notice the strong perfume smell. Upon inspection
they discover over one hundred pounds of narcotics in the back of the vehicle, and immediately
arrest the driver. She is subsequently convicted of possession on a willful blindness charge. If
this fact pattern seems preposterous, it is the exact fact pattern that the Ninth Circuit felt
supported a willful blindness charge in United States v. Heredia. 178 In Heredia, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the woman' s failure to investigate the contents of her vehicle despite her
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suspicion of criminal activity was sufficient to support a willful blindness charge. 179 If nothing
else, this case demonstrates the potential scope of a broad willful blindness charge and serves as
a cautionary tale to those who fear unfair or excessive prosecution.
This is a particular worry to the extent that a broad definition of willful blindness may not
clearly distinguish itself from recklessness mens rea. As defined by the MPC:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's
situation. 180
However, where the failure to investigate a suspicion of wrongdoing (an omission to act) is
sufficient to meet the definition of deliberate action, there is little to distinguish the omission to
investigate from the act of recklessly disregarding a risk. While under the Spurr duty-standard,
the existence of a defendant's duty to act ensures that an omission to investigate is more than a
simple lapse of judgment or negligent omission, broadly categorizing all failures to investigate as
"deliberate action" affords no such reassurance. Absent a requirement that omission to
investigate will create liability only where the actor owes a duty, it appears on the surface that
there is little to distinguish willful blindness from recklessness. However according to Marcus,
recklessness under the Model Penal Code requires the jury to make a determination as to the
social utility of the defendant's conduct, to the extent that where a jury concludes that the
conduct was of little social utility, the defendant's awareness of the risks need only be low. 181
This language of social utility is completely absent from the definition of willful blindness
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offered by the Court in Global-Tech. 182 Under Global-Tech, juries must still find that the
defendant had a subjective awareness of a high probability of the existence of wrongdoing,
which distinguishes willful blindness from recklessness by requiring much high awareness on the
part of the defendant. Nevertheless where the government's only assertion is that a defendant
failed to investigate a suspicion, willful blindness charges may result in convictions with little to
no evidence of actual knowledge and for conduct that is likely merely reckless.
C. Deliberate Action-A voidance for the Purpose of Escaping Sanction
In its discussion of the elements of willful blindness, the majority noted in Global- Tech
that "a willfully blind defendant is one who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high
probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be said to have actually known the critical
facts." 183 Towards the close of its opinion in Global-Tech, the Supreme Court noted that

Pentalpha provided little explanation as to why it chose not to disclose to the attorney performing
the right-to-use study the fact that it had copied its design from a foreign-marketed version of
SEB' s patented product. 184 The Court stated: "On the facts of this case, we cannot fathom what
motive [Pentalpha] could have had for withholding this information other than to manufacture a
claim of plausible deniability in the event that [the] company was later accused of patent
. _,:: .
"185
1n1nngement.

Read in conjunction with the Court's statement that a willfully blind defendant "can
almost be said to have actually known the critical facts," 186 a plausible interpretation of
deliberate action would require that the defendant avoided learning a critical fact with the
specific purpose of escaping civil or criminal sanction. As noted by O'Toole, some courts prior
182
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to Global-Tech held that the defendant's desire to escape criminal sanction was an essential
element to a willful blindness charge, and the reference to Pentalpha' s motivation to create
"plausible deniability" seems to support such a requirement.

187

This interpretation would

require prosecutors seeking to invoke willful blindness to prove that the defendant' s alleged
ignorance was actually a contrivance designed to hinder legal action against the defendant.
Similarly, some early English courts required the prosecution show that the defendant ignorance
was a charade. 188 In effect, willful blindness would only attach in situations that the wrongdoing
and illegality were so plainly evident to the defendant that his or her claimed ignorance was an
act self-servingly designed to exonerate the defendant.
The result of this interpretation would be to place a considerable evidentiary obstacle in
front of any prosecutor seeking to invoke the willful blindness standard and would likely render
it a useless doctrine. For instance, in a case such as Heredia 189 where the chief witnesses for the
prosecution are arresting officers and drug enforcement agents, it would be virtually impossible
for a prosecution to elicit testimony from a defendant that he acted for the purpose of creating a
defense in case of future litigation. Few if any criminals would be so brazen as to make such an
admission. Furthermore, this standard would draw an arbitrary distinction between defendants
who were legally savvy and those who were ignorant of the law, rewarding the latter with a
potential defense. To the extent that a defendant is ignorant of the law, they cannot be said to
have acted for the purpose of evading or escaping criminal sanction. As a result, unsophisticated
criminals have a much stronger defense when charged with willful blindness. Judge Browning
warned in Jewell that criminal enterprises like the drug trade are predicated upon as many
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participants as possible being as ignorant as possible of the facts surrounding the trade. 190 If
deliberate action applies only to criminals who act for the purpose of escaping criminal sanction,
then Global-Tech stands for the proposition that ignorant drugs mules, who often possess little to
no understanding of the legal system, will be able to defeat willful blindness charges based on
their own ignorance. Whether the Supreme Court intended to make such a glaring distinction
between savvy criminals and ignorant henchmen is unclear.
D. The Appropriate Interpretation of Deliberate Action
As a result of the ambiguities inherent to the Supreme Court's ruling, lower courts
interpreting the holding of Global-Tech will likely develop wildly divergent definitions of
conduct sufficient to prove deliberate action in willful blindness cases. To this extent, the
Supreme Court will likely need to step in at some future time in order to provide lower courts
with guidance on how to appropriately construe the requirements for willful blindness. The
Supreme Court will need to balance the importance of such charges against the likelihood that
their abuse will create undesirable legal consequences. Willful blindness instructions have
become an invaluable tool to prosecutors seeking to hold defendants liable where the defendants
took great efiorts to defeat a finding of actual knowledge through contrived ignorance. 191 In
Jewell, the court noted that by requiring a demonstration of actual knowledge on the part of

defendants and disallowing willful blindness charges, courts would reward otherwise criminal
actors with acquittal for deliberately making themselves ignorant as to certain facts. 192 Entire
criminal enterprises such as the drug trade are predicated on the fact that participants will try to
inoculate themselves from future prosecution by limiting their knowledge of the business. While
it is critical that participants in such illegal activities not be allowed to protect themselves by
190
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skirting the definition of actual knowledge, it is equally important that the scope of willful
blindness does not exceed this use. As stated by the Supreme Court in Global- Tech, an overly
broad interpretation of willful blindness would allow criminal convictions of defendants who
were at most severely reckless or negligent in their behavior. 193 While each of the
aforementioned interpretations of the deliberate action standard may be plausible given a
particular reading of Global- Tech, none seem to provide the flexibility required by courts in
applying such a useful and potentially onerous doctrine as willful blindness.
As a result, in future cases the Supreme Court should adopt a totality of the circumstances
test to determine whether or not a defendant's conduct in avoiding knowledge rose to the level of
deliberate action sufficient to prove willful blindness. Under this model, the court would decide
the degree of conduct necessary to prove deliberate action based on the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the case. While this method would not provide a bright-line rule, it
decreases the likelihood of wrongful conviction without making willful blindness extraordinarily
difficult to demonstrate. The Court would weigh such factors as: (1) whether the defendant
actually shielded himself from the facts as opposed to simply ignoring a risk; (2) whether the
defendant had some advanced warning as to wrongdoing; (3) whether there is evidence that the
defendant contrived his claims of ignorance in order to escape criminal or civil sanction; (4)
whether evidence exists demonstrating that the defendant actually did not know of the material
fact; (5) whether the degree of effort necessary to discern the facts or investigate the risk of
wrong doing was extraordinary or not; (6) whether the defendant had some duty, implied or
express, to investigate risks; (7) whether the defendant's conduct under the circumstances can be
attributed to carelessness as opposed to design; (8) whether through their conduct the defendant
exacerbated or invited the risk; and, finally, (9) the nature of the underlying charge, such as
193
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whether it is for a drug possession crime as opposed to a white-collar crime. The advantage of a
totality of the circumstances test is that it would reduce the risk of unjust convictions by granting
judges the ability to weigh certain facts on appeal, while simultaneously leaving willful blindness
as a viable option to plaintiffs and prosecutors in situations in which evidence of a defendant's
actual knowledge is not forthcoming.
The utility of a totality of the circumstances test is best demonstrated by its application to
a model fact pattern and model statute. Consider the following hypothetical situation: a federal
statute makes it '"unlawful to purposefully or knowingly sell a firearm to an individual who
intends to use it in commission of a crime insofar as the firearm substantially affects interstate
commerce." Defendant Robert owns a firearms store that exclusively sells firearms that are
purchased from out of state sources. Robert placed a large sign in front of his store that
advertised "Bob's Guns-No Questions Asked!'' On January 17, 2012, Andrew walked into
Robert's firearms store shouting loudly. Defendant Robert heard Andrew murmur that Andrew
hated his boss for firing Andrew and that he would never forgive his boss. Andrew asked to
purchase a pistol from Robert and inspected several different pistols before making his final
selection. Robert suspected that Andrew was capable of violence towards his boss; however, he
did not question Andrew about his motivations for purchasing a pistol or about Andrew's
feelings towards his boss. Robert sold the pistol to Andrew and the next day learned that
Andrew had used the pistol that night to rob his boss. Andrew entered into a plea agreement
with the government and agreed to testify that the pistol he used to rob his boss was the same
firearm that Robert sold to him. When questioned by police, Robert admitted that he
remembered Andrew and remembered hearing Andrew express distaste for his boss, but that he
did not investigate any further. Robert is charged under the federal statute with knowingly
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selling a firearm to an individual who intended to use it in the commission of a crime. At trial,
the prosecution seeks a willful blindness charge against Robert with regards to whether he knew
Andrew intended to use the firearm in the commission of a crime.
Depending on the circuit's interpretation of the deliberate-action requirement in the
willful blindness charge, different results will likely follow. For instance, if the court found that
a failure to investigate suspicions of wrongdoing will result in a successful willful blindness
claim only in cases where the defendant owes a duty to investigate, 194 defendant Robert would
likely be acquitted of the charge if he owes no legally cognizable duty to investigate. Robert did
not take steps to prevent Andrew from divulging his plan. Rather Robert sat in silence and chose
not to investigate at all. Had Andrew began to tell Robert of his plans for the pistol and Robert
prevented him from completing his story, Robert could be convicted under a willful blindness
charge to the extent that Robert actively prevented Andrew from revealing to him his intent to
use the weapon in the commission of a crime.
If the court adopted a bright-line rule that any failure to investigate a suspicion of
wrongdoing was sufficient to demonstrate deliberate action for the purposes of willful
blindness, 195 Robert would almost certainly be subject to a willful blindness charge. Under the
fact pattern, regardless of how seriously Robert took the actual threat posed by Andrew, he
would be subject to a willful blindness charge because he did not stop and question Andrew
about his intended use of the firearm. If Robert' s failure to investigate Andrew' s intended use
for the firearm satisfies the deliberate action requirement, then ultimate question is whether or
not Robert was aware of a high probability of wrongdoing on the part of Andrew. To the extent
that Robert heard Andrew angrily enter the store and describe his disdain for his boss, it is
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unlikely Robert can argue that he was unaware of a high probability that Andrew intended to use
the firearm against his boss.
The shortcomings of the previous interpretations highlight the significant advantages of
applying a totality of the circumstances test to the question of what constitutes deliberate action
in a willful blindness charge. As stated above, juries and judges would be able to consider such
factors as whether or not the defendant actively shielded his or herself from information as
opposed to choosing not to investigate further, whether the defendant had advanced warning of
the wrongdoing or whether the defendant exacerbated the situation through his or her conduct.
In this fact pattern, the jury would be allowed to consider the fact that Robert had advertised his
store as "No questions asked!" and whether or not Robert had a pecuniary interest in selling a
firearm to a man who was clearly agitated. The jury would be allowed to consider Robert's
relationship with Andrew and whether or not Robert had an interest in not probing in Andrew's
intended use of the firearm.
But most importantly, a totality of the circumstances test would not pigeonhole a jury
into deciding the case based on a single fact. Under each of the other potential interpretations of
deliberate action, a single factor could decide an entire case regardless of the defendant's
conduct. Clever defendants could avoid criminal sanction by simply choosing not to investigate,
whereas unfortunate defendants who were simply acting out of fear could doom themselves to
conviction. However, like the Jewell standard, the totality of the circumstances test does suffer
from the fact that it does not clearly distinguish itself from recklessness mens rea. The dutystandard under the Spurr regime creates a clear distinction between willful blindness and
recklessness by ensuring that the defendant's failure to investigate creates criminal liability only
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where the defendant was under an affirmative duty to act. 196 This ensures that the defendant's
omission was the product of a conscious choice and was not simply the result of negligent or
even reckless disregard for risks.
In contrast, a totality of the circumstances test trades this clear distinction between willful
blindness and recklessness for greater flexibility in application. As a consequence the totality of
the circumstances test creates greater uncertainty in application, as the boundary between willful
blindness and recklessness breaks down. However, it is still possible to distinguish recklessness
from willful blindness to the extent that the former still requires a jury to determine the social
utility of a reckless defendant's conduct. 197 This requirement is wholly absent from the Court' s
definition of willful blindness in Global-Tech, which specified that "a willfully blind defendant
is one who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and
who can almost be said to have actually known the criticalfacts." 198 To the extent that willful
blindness requires a jury to make a subjective inquiry into whether the defendant was aware of a
high probability of wrongdoing and to determine that the defendant can almost be said to have
actually known of the wrongdoing, it is distinguishable from recklessness. However, it is still
unclear if a totality of the circumstances test in application would not lead to uncertain results.
Nevertheless, the advantages of a more flexible approach to the deliberate action requirement
under the totality of the circumstances test outweigh the narrow and rigid requirements of any of
the previously described interpretations. Ultimately, uncertainty is the cost paid for creating a
standard that blurs the line between knowledge and recklessness. Regardless, a totality of the
circumstances test would allow juries and judges the flexibility necessary to properly apply the
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willful blindness standard without giving prosecutors a cudgel with which to prosecute truly
ignorant defendants.
V. CONCLUSION
In Global-Tech , the Supreme Court developed a uniform definition of willful blindness
for all lower federal courts to the extent that it defined a willfully blind defendant as "one who
takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who can
almost be said to have actually known the critical facts." 199 Although the Court's requirement
that a defendant be found to have an awareness of a high probability of wrongdoing is relatively
non-controversial given the history of the willful blindness doctrine in the various circuit courts,
evidence that the deliberate action requirement is relatively alien to most lower courts' definition
of willful blindness casts doubt on the clarity of the Supreme Court's holding. 200 While the
Supreme Court's definition of willful blindness appears clear on its face, it is apparent from a
close reading of the facts of the case and the precedent cited that the Court must clarify what it
means by "deliberate action in avoiding discovery of material facts." The cases which the
Supreme Court cites in defense of its use of the willful blindness doctrine are hugely conflicting
to the extent that contradictory interpretations of the deliberate action can result. Depending on
the line of cases followed, a lower court interpreting deliberate action could conclude that it
requires showings ranging from consciously ignoring a suspicion of wrongdoing to requiring that
prosecutors demonstrate that the defendant "put on blinders" and actively prevented himself
from gathering actual knowledge of wrongdoing for the purpose of manufacturing a defense in
future litigation.
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As a result of these ambiguities, it is clear that the Supreme Court will need to provide
future guidance to lower courts on how best to interpret the deliberate action requirement.
Although each of the above mentioned interpretations of the deliberate action requirement are
plausible given the right reading of Global-Tech , none appears to adequately balance the
interests of prosecutors and defendants in criminal trials. Although willful blindness instructions
have greatly aided prosecutors in convicting defendants who have sought to circumvent justice
through manufacturing their own ignorance, an excessively broad reading of the deliberate action
requirement risks unjust criminal convictions. As a result, the Supreme Court should move away
from these potential interpretations in future rulings and instead adopt a totality of the
circumstances test. Under such a test, lower courts would decide the degree of conduct
necessary to demonstrate deliberate action based on all the attendant circumstances surrounding
the case. While such an interpretation would not afford courts a bright-line rule, it would grant
them the flexibility necessary to protect the interests of defendants while also allowing them to
defeat the machinations of crafty criminals. Regardless of whatever interpretation the Supreme
Court may mandate in the future, it is clear from the ambiguities and lack of clarity in the
Court' s decision in Global-Tech that future guidance will be necessary if lower courts are to
have any hope of providing uniform and consistent rulings in willful blindness prosecutions.
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